State v. Osborn Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 44965 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-7-2017
State v. Osborn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44965
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Osborn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44965" (2017). Not Reported. 3955.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3955
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




MICHAEL ROBERT OSBORN, 
 












          NO. 44965 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2016-24383 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Osborn failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing an aggregate, unified sentence of 36 years, with 17 years fixed, upon his guilty pleas to 
burglary, assault on a correctional officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, two counts of 




Osborn Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Osborn pled guilty to burglary, assault on a correctional officer, unlawful possession of a 
firearm, two counts of intimidating a witness, and petit theft and the district court imposed an 
aggregate, unified sentence of 36 years, with 17 years fixed, and ordered that the sentence run 
 2 
concurrently with Osborn’s sentences in three other cases.  (R., pp.136-41.)  Osborn filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.144-46.)  He also filed a timely 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.156-64, 190-
94.)    
Osborn asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence in light of his substance abuse, desire for treatment, mental health issues, and support of 
family and friends.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  Osborn has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of 
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed 
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  State 
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory 
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant 
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The 
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when 
deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of 
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
 3 
reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).    
The maximum prison sentence for burglary is 10 years; the maximum prison sentence for 
assault on a correctional officer is 25 years; and unlawful possession of a weapon and felony 
intimidating a witness both carry a maximum sentence of five years.  I.C. §§ 18-1403, -
915(1)(a), -3316(1), -2604, -112.  The district court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years, 
with four years fixed, for burglary; 10 years, with eight years fixed, for aggravated assault on a 
law enforcement officer; five years fixed for unlawful possession of a firearm; and five years, 
with zero years fixed, for each count of intimidating a witness, all of which fall within the 
statutory guidelines.1  (R., pp.136-41.)  Osborn’s sentence is reasonable in light of his ongoing 
decisions to endanger others and his failure to rehabilitate.   
Osborn’s criminal record demonstrates his disregard for the law, the terms of community 
supervision, and the well-being of others.  Osborn’s first felony conviction was for discharging a 
firearm at a house, occupied building, or vehicle in 2003 and he was sentenced to a period of 
retained jurisdiction, which he did not successfully complete.  (PSI, pp.7-9.)  After being paroled 
in December of 2005, Osborn was convicted of robbery in 2006 and sentenced to 25 years in 
prison.  (PSI, pp.7, 9.)  Osborn was placed on parole in February 2014, and an agent’s warrant 
for a parole violation was issued in September of 2014.  (PSI, p.9.)  Osborn was released from 
incarceration in June 2015, and a warrant was again issued the very next month.  (PSI, p.9.)
                                            
1 The court also imposed a consecutive indeterminate one-year jail sentence for petit theft.  (R., 
p.137.) 
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After another period of incarceration, Osborn was placed on parole in February 2016, and two 
months later he committed the crimes of burglary and grand theft in case number 44964.  (PSI, 
p.9.)  He committed the crimes of which he was convicted in this case just four months later.  
(PSI, pp.7-9.)  Osborn also committed multiple disciplinary offenses while in incarcerated, 
including: disrespect to a commanding officer, intent to injure, group disruption, sexual activity, 
outside of authorized boundaries, horse play, battery, unauthorized transfer of property, and 
disobedience to orders.  (PSI, pp.62-75.)  Osborn’s desire for treatment and support from family 
and friends do not outweigh the seriousness of the offenses, his demonstrated inability or 
unwillingness to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law, and the need for 
community protection. 
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its 
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Osborn’s sentence.  (3/13/17 Tr., p.49, L.15 – 
p.53, L.7.)  The district court specifically recognized Osborn’s “mental-health issues and … very 
pervasive drug addiction” but determined the sentenced it imposed was necessary for the 
protection of society, reasoning, “[W]hile mental health can be a mitigating factor, when the 
result is this time of violent conduct, it is also an aggravating factor that weighs in favor of 
needing treatment that’s only available in an incarcerated setting to actually protect the public.”  
(3/15/17 Tr., p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.1.)  The state submits that Osborn has failed to establish that 
his sentence is excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing 
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)  
Osborn next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence because he is maintaining his sobriety in prison and is 
enrolled in school.  (Appellant’s brief, p.5-6.)  If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, 
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a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews 
the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  To prevail on appeal, Osborn must “show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of 
the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Osborn has failed to satisfy his burden.   
The district court considered the information Osborn provided with respect to his sobriety 
and enrollment in school, but found the information did not warrant any reduction of Osborn’s 
sentence, reasoning, “Although these are commendable endeavors, the Defendant has not alleged 
any new facts or evidence sufficient to demonstrate leniency may be appropriate.  Defendant has 
been given several opportunities for rehabilitation prior to the event of this case and each time 
has reoffended.”  (R., p.194.)  The district court was correct.  While Osborn’s latest rehabilitative 
efforts are commendable, they do not outweigh the seriousness of the offenses, the danger 
Osborn presents to the community, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred.   
  The district court considered all of the relevant information and appropriately concluded 
that Osborn’s sentence was appropriate because “the actions of [the] Defendant have shown a 
pattern of behavior that is dangerous to society which is the primary consideration in 
sentencing.”  (R., p.194.)  Osborn has not shown that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence 
simply because he has maintained his sobriety and is enrolled in school.  Given any reasonable 
view of the facts, Osborn has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Osborn’s conviction and sentences and 
the district court’s order denying Osborn’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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1 what's bought us all here is my choices combined with me 1 in that he !.-pends only about six months in the military, 
2 using the drugs, and I'm just -- I am -- I haven't maybe 2 was medically discharged for an injw-y at basic 
3 in the past been ve1-y accountable. 3 training, so this isn't a service-induced mental-health 
4 In one of the situations that Mr. Dinger 4 issues and whether they're derive from his time in 
5 referenced in 2006, I w11sn't. However, I do feel on 5 custody or from other aspects, the record is complicated 
6 these situations I have been, and I do acknowledge what 6 to say the least. 
7 my part in everything was and that I was wrong, and I 7 But what is clear is that this was a violent act 
8 don't make an excuse for it, and I am sorry that the 8 of entering for the burglary. He entered with the 
9 things that I did took place. That's all I have to say. 9 intent to actually scare the re.'3idents into paying this 
10 THE.COURT: Thnnkyou. 10 debt, and as a result of that behavior, then becomes 
11 Does either party have any legal cause why 11 this violent interaction with the police officers. The 
12 sentence cannot be imposed? 12 clear record that he should not have a firearm because 
13 MR. DINGER: No. 13 of prior instances, and then after all of that is 
14 MR. NONA: No, Judge. 14 certainly aggravated with the two intimidating witness 
15 Tl-tE COURT: In this case, I've considered the 15 charges. 
16 factors which I'm required to consider, which includes 16 So while 1 do agree he docs have mental-health 
17 the protection of society, the deterrence of crime, the 17 issues and a very pervasive drug addiction, when I 
18 rehabilitation of the offender as well as punishment. 18 consider all of the factors that I have to consider, the 
19 I've also considered the criteria for placing someone on 19 primary factor that is the court's concern is protection 
20 probation or imposing imprisonment under 19-2521. 20 of society, and when he acts in a violent way against 
21 This case is one of those difficult cases where 21 law-enforcement and other people, while mental health 
22 the evidence related to mitigation is also the evidence 22 can be a mitigating factor, when the result is t his time 
23 related to aggravation, where he obviously has 23 of violent conduct, it is also an aggravating factor 
24 substantial mental-health issue,s. I don't find that the 24 that weighs in favor of needing treatment that's only 
25 PTSD and other issues derive from his military service 25 available in an incarcerated setting to actually protect 
49 so 
1 the public. 1 misdemeanor, I 'll enter 1 year indeterminate, which will 
2 So in this particular case, I'm going to impose 2 run consecutively, so, with that, that is a total of a 
3 a judgment of conviction on all counts. The sentences 3 17-year sentence that's fixed, 19 that are indeterminate 
4 in this case will run consecutive to eacb other. 4 for a total of 36 years with credit for time se1ved of 
5 However, each one of these sentences will run 5 220 days on each count. 
6 concurrently with CR-FE-2016-4203, CR-FE-2002-797 and 6 So in my calculation, Mr. Osborn will actually 
1 CR-FE-2006-431. To the extent that each one of these 7 be eligible for parole slightly before he turns the age 
8 are consecutive sentences, he will also be given credit 8 of 50. I recognize that that is a substantial period of 
9 for time served under current law for each count, and 1 9 incarceration, but given the nature of this offense -
10 calculate his current credit for time se1ved on each 10 and it's not this offense. It is these offenses because 
11 count in this case to be 220 days. 11 each one were separate offenses, and while I appreciate 
12 On Count 1, the burglai-y, I'm going to enter a 12 the fact that they could have been derived from a drug 
13 judgment of conviction with 4 years fixed, 6 years 13 addiction, there are those that are involved with drugs 
14 indeterminate for a total of 10 years. On Count 2, the 14 that do not have that continuing course of conduct to 
16 aggravated assault 011 a law-enforcement officer, I'll 15 continue to commit crime.s even after the first clime is 
16 enter a judgment of conviction with 8 years fixed, 2 16 committed. 
17 years indeterminate for a total of 10 years that will 17 And so I recognize in fashioning this sentence, 
18 run consecutively. On Count 3, the unlawful possession 18 he will be slightly before his 50 bilthday before he 
19 of a firearm, I'll enter a sentence of 5 years fixed 19 will be eligible for parole. Whether he is eligible for 
20 that will consecutively. On Count 4, the intimidating a 20 parole will depend on his behavior and bis conduct 
21 witness, 111 enter a judgment of conviction with zero 21 within the institution, and that, for this particular 
22 years fixed, 5 years indeterminate that will run 22 sentence, he would then be 68 years old whenever he was 
23 consecutively. On Count 5, intimidating a witness, I'll 23 off supe1vision, which recognizing that 67 is probably 
24 enter zero years fixed, 5 years indeterminate that would 24 his age whe1·e he could qualify for social security if he 
25 run consecutively. On Count 6, the petty theft, a 25 had enough qualifying years of work history to meet that 
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1 social security age, and so l have actually considered 1 costs on each count. To that extent, if the state wants 
2 that in my calculation because I do think that 2 to submit a separate order, the state can submit a 
3 rehabilitation of the offender is important, given the 3 separate order digitally and that would be signed by the 
4 fact that he is still 1·elatively young but also weighing 4 court. 
5 it when I'm considering the violent nature of these 5 Now, Mr. Osborn, this is a final judgment. You 
6 particular offenses and the importance of protecting 6 have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
7 society as well. 7 The time for taking an appeal is 42 days from the date 
8 I'm going to order court costs on each count. 8 thejudgment is made and filed. You may be represented 
9 I'm going to waive a fine. I will require him to submit 9 by counsel in bringing that appeal. First, if you 
10 a DNA sample if the department of corrections wants 10 cannot afford to hire counsel for the appeal, you would 
11 another sample because it is required under the statute, 11 have to demonstrate that you're indigent under Title 19 
12 but I'm not going to require him to pay for that sample 12 of the Idaho Code, but if you were successful in tliat 
13 since he has previously submitted a sample. If the 13 demonstration, the court would appoint the state 
14 state has an amended no contact order with the victim, 14 appellate public defender to represent you and that 
15 Stevie Christensen, I will extend that no contact order 15 would also include the cost of the appeal. 
16 to expire March 12 of 2053, which would be the 16 If the parties printed any sentencing materials, 
17 expiration of his sentence in this case. If he's 17 those can be returned to the court. Those materials 
18 discharged early, then, obviously, that no contact order 18 will be shredded because the official court file is tlie 
19 would be effected by the commission of pardons and 19 digital record in this case. 
20 paroles with that discharge. 20 MR. NONA: Judge, we only printed out one 
21 And then also as part of the plea agreement, the 21 version of the PSI, and can we keep this till Wednesday 
22 parties and agreed to an order of forfeiture of property 22 and then surrender it to Judge Reardon? 
23 and payment of cash held in evidence to the Ada County 23 THE COURT: Yes. 
24 C,'lerk to pay any fines, fees, costs and restitution. 24 MR. DINGER: The same for us. Thank you. 
25 The cost in this particular case are only the court 25 THE COURT: Okay. Yes, please, make sure that 
53 54 
1 Judge Reardon knows he needs to collect those materials. 
2 MR. NONA: Yeah. 
3 THE COURT: And I have a copy of the no contact 
4 order. 
5 Anything else we need to take up in this matter? 
6 MR. DINGER: No. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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